Introduction
During the past few decades, infertility 1 has been on the rise. This reality has been confirmed by a recent study conducted by the World Health Organisation (WHO), which indicates that infertility currently affects 10.5% of individuals globally. 2 On a national scale it is estimated that 15-20% of the population struggles with infertility. 3 The implication of this is that 10.5% of the world's population may never be able to procreate; 4 that is, unless recourse is had to assisted reproductive technology (ART) 5
to facilitate reproduction.
One form of ART that is more commonly being used to overcome infertility is surrogacy. Surrogacy makes use of a gestational carrier as a conduit for reproduction.
This process itself and its reliance on a third party in the reproductive process have been met with severe criticism for a number of reasons. 6 Despite the opposition to the practice, individuals who now pursue this option do so either because their attempts at adoption -a proposed alternative way of acquiring a child -have proved unsuccessful 7 or because there is a need for an offspring that bears a genetic link with the commissioning parent(s). 8 Regardless of the reasons why surrogacy is utilised, up until recently the legal regulation of surrogacy in South Africa has been shrouded in much uncertainty. 9 It was only with the promulgation of Chapter 19 of the Children's Act 10 that some clarity 11
was provided on the issue of surrogacy under South African law and the conditions under which surrogacy may be undertaken and surrogate motherhood agreements (SMA) may be entered into. 12 However, despite the benefits that this chapter holds, it is not without pitfalls. 13 Section 294 is one such pitfall. 14 It provides that surrogacy agreements are invalid in situations where the child born lacks a genetic link with the commissioning parent(s).
In an era where infertility is more common, 15 this section raises a number of concerns:
some constitutional 16 and others ethical and moral. The response to this criticism has been a suggestion that the parties concerned consider adoption as an alternative. 17 This suggestion assumes that adoption is an alternative to surrogacy.
7
This lack of success may be attributed to a decrease in the number of children available for adoption due to the availability of contraceptives and legislation which permits the termination of unwanted pregnancies. See Louw "Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood" fn 4.
8
Although there are individuals who utilise surrogacy who have no desire to adopt a child or who do not require a genetic link. Instead their desire is for a child whom they will raise from birth, which may not be possible in the case of adoption, as the number of adoptable children has been on the decline in recent years. See Jackman 2013 http://goo.gl/ejOQsq.
9
Mills 2010 Stell LR 429-430. 10 Children's Act 38 of 2005.
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I say some, as the recent case law suggests that there is no complete certainty. See Ex parte MS 2014 JDR 0102 (GNP) and Louw 2014 De Jure 110-118 for a discussion of Ex parte MS 2014 JDR 0102 (GNP), where the courts had to consider the validity of a SMA concluded after artificial fertilisation had taken place.
This article thus aims to critically analyse section 294 and the issues it raises. It further considers whether adoption is an alternative to surrogacy in the light of the assumption made. Of necessity the discussion considers the importance of a genetic link in acquiring a child, and alternatives thereto. In conclusion, recommendations are made for a way forward.
The mechanics of surrogacy
Before embarking on a discussion of the constitutionality -or otherwise -of section 294, it is first necessary to briefly illustrate the ways in which surrogacy can arise.
A distinction is made between gestational or full surrogacy and traditional or partial surrogacy. 18 Gestational or full surrogacy describes those circumstances in which use is made of a surrogate mother but without recourse to her gametes. 19 In this instance she is merely the vessel that carries the foetus from conception to birth. In contrast, traditional or partial surrogacy occurs where the surrogate provides both her gametes and her body as a conduit in the reproductive process. 20 While gestational or full surrogacy is more often preferred, 21 traditional or partial surrogacy is more commonly used. 22 Depending on the type of surrogacy used, parenthood could be achieved in a number of different ways. The illustrations proposed do not make provision for those instances where a gamete is the product of more than one donor, as is the case in mitochondrial transfer. 25 In terms of the scenarios illustrated above, currently only (a), (c), (e) and ( This raises a number of questions regarding the constitutionality of section 294, which will be discussed below.
24
For example an anatomical defect or as a result of infections or surgery. See Kruger and Botha Clinical Gynaecology 339.
25
Mitochondrial transfer occurs where an "affected mitochondria is replaced by mitochondria from a donor that is free of any DNA disorder. The intention is that these techniques would prevent the transfer of serious mitochondrial disease from mother to child whilst allowing the mother to have her own genetically related child". See UK Department of Health 2014 https://goo.gl/n7XoQa. This procedure is currently banned in many countries, although the UK has recently passed legislation permitting research in this area. It is unlikely, however, that this process will be used in cases of surrogacy, as the child will then have three genetic parents instead of two. Surrogacy, as is, is already complicated with the introduction of a third, fourth and fifth party to the reproductive process without adding the complication of one gamete having two genetic providers. However, strictly speaking this may become possible in future in instances where a husband or wife is infertile, the other spouse is not, yet is a carrier of a life-threatening disease which he or she would prefer not to transfer to the offspring. In these instances mitochondrial transfer of either the surrogate or a donor may provide the answer to producing a child that is at least partly connected to one of the commissioning parents.
3
The legalities of section 294 ("the genetic link requirement")
Section 294 provides that:
No surrogate motherhood agreement is valid unless the conception of the child contemplated in the agreement is to be effected by the use of the gametes of both commissioning parents or, if that is not possible due to biological, medical or other valid reasons, the gamete of at least one of the commissioning parents or, where the commissioning parent is a single person, the gamete of that person.
The ideal situation contemplated in this section is that of full or traditional surrogacy where the surrogate is merely a conduit in the reproductive process and has no genetic link to the child. The reason for this preference was highlighted in the report of the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee in its investigation into surrogacy 26 prior to the promulgation of the Children's Act. It was noted that if "the surrogate is genetically linked to the child or children, she will always be a factor to be considered in the commissioning parents' relationship with the child or children", 27 and this was to be avoided as far as possible. In its consultative process the South African Law Commission also advocated the need for a genetic link. Its reasoning was that enforcing such a requirement would prevent surrogacy from being a form of child trade. 34 The implication of this is that the presence of a genetic link will prevent the commodification of babies. Whether or not these assertions are correct remain questionable and will be considered below.
Challenges to the implementation of section 294
3.1.1 Is section 294 unconstitutional?
As indicated above, where no genetic link is possible, surrogacy is not an option and alternative forms of founding a family -in particular adoption -must be considered. In fact on a recent perusal of a 2014 textbook on constitutional law the author was disconcerted to discover that no mention is made of s 12 of the Constitution at all. Another textbook dedicated only 5 lines to a discussion on the right to make decisions regarding reproduction -a right which at some time or other will affect almost every individual.
40
It should be noted that while the South African Constitution protects the right to make decisions regarding reproduction, other international human rights instruments protect the right to found a family. Examples are a 16 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) and a 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1953) . The challenge posed by the wording of s 12 of the Constitution is that it arguably raises questions about the availability of this right to persons who are infertile and are thus unable to reproduce naturally. In contrast, the right to found a family is broader as it deals with the idea of founding families in ways that are not restricted to natural conception.
On the one hand it could be argued that legislation permitting access to contraceptives and terminations of pregnancy are available only to individuals who can benefit from their use. By this reasoning, a woman who is thus not pregnant would not need access to a termination, and therefore the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 41 would not apply to her. Similarly, the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights relating to children, citizens and detained persons are not available to everyone. They are available only to those individuals who qualify, namely children, citizens and detained persons. Based on this logic, the right enshrined in section 12(2)(a) does not extend to those who are infertile, but only to those who are fertile.
On the other hand, section 12(2)(a) provides that everyone [emphasis added] has the right to make decisions regarding reproduction. This section is in no way qualified to suggest that it is restricted to fertile individuals. This presumably suggests -in the absence of evidence to the contrary -that everyone can make decisions regarding reproduction regardless of whether they are fertile or not. Such an interpretation seems most tenable in the light of the fact that individuals may not be entirely infertile, but may suffer from varying degrees of subfertility. 42 Adopting the approach that section 12(2)(a) confers the right to make decisions regarding reproduction to both the fertile and infertile, the author is of the opinion that the content of "the right to decide" includes the right to make use of natural conception or conception by assisted means. 43 This entails deciding whether to make use of one's own gametes or those of a gamete donor and whether recourse will be had to a surrogate mother or not.
Arguably this right to decide -as an expression of bodily and psychological integrity -could include deciding to procreate by means of a surrogate even in circumstances where the person exercising this right is fertile and capable of reproducing personally 41 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 42 If this right had been qualified, individuals' rights would have been severely and unduly restricted if they were subfertile and not allowed to make decisions regarding reproduction.
43
As the content of the right to decide has not been clarified, it could presumably include any exercise of choice pertaining to reproduction.
and without assistance, but chooses not to do so. 44 However, this issue is too complex to discuss here and does not fall within the scope of this article.
For the purposes of this article, the author is of the opinion that infertile individuals have the right to decide whether to procreate using their own gametes or those of donors, or to use a surrogate. 45 Section 294 of the Children's Act, however, denies infertile individuals, at least those who cannot provide a genetic link, the right to resort to surrogacy and in so doing denies them their rights under section 12 (2) Section 36 provides that:
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, includinga) The nature of the right; b)
The importance of the purpose of the limitation; c)
The nature and extent of the limitation; d)
The relation between the limitation and its purpose; and e) Less restrictive ways to achieve the purpose.
44
For example, a female who opts to focus on her career and decides to make use of a surrogate to procreate when she in fact is biologically capable of doing so.
45
This view appears to be in line with that expressed by Lewis Constitutional and Contractual Implications 4 who interprets s 12(2) as including choosing to have a child "that they would not ordinarily be able to have" presumably by whatever means available, ie either adoption or assisted reproduction.
When called upon to interpret the meaning of section 36 (or section 33 as it then was under the Interim Constitution 46 ) the Constitutional Court held: 47
The criteria prescribed by section 33(1) for any limitation of the rights contained in section … are that the limitation must be justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality, it must be both reasonable and necessary and it must not negate the essential content of the right.
The limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary in a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values, and ultimately an assessment based on proportionality. This is implicit in the provisions of section 33(1). The fact that different rights have different implications for democracy, and in the case of our Constitution, for "an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality", means that there is no absolute standard which can be laid down for determining reasonableness and necessity. Principles can be established, but the application of those principles to particular circumstances can only be done on a case by case basis. This is inherent in the requirement of proportionality, which calls for the balancing of different interests. In the balancing process, the relevant considerations will include the nature of the right that is limited, and its importance to an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; the purpose for which the right is limited and the importance of that purpose to such a society; the extent of the limitation, its efficacy, and particularly where the limitation has to be necessary, whether the desired ends could reasonably be achieved through other means less damaging to the right in question.
Section 294 qualifies as a law of general application 48 as it is prescribed by the (1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.
(2) … (3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. (4) … (5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.
provide genetic material for surrogacy and those who cannot, which constitutes discrimination.
Section 9(3) of the Constitution further provides that if the discrimination is on a listed ground, then the discrimination is presumed to be unfair. Section 294 thus unfairly discriminates against this group. This view is in line with that expressed by Carnelley and Soni, 57 who are of the opinion that the differentiation caused by section 294 amounts to discrimination on the basis of disability, which then constitutes unfair discrimination.
Alternatively, if an inability to provide gametes is not viewed as a listed ground, the differentiation on this basis does not automatically amount to discrimination.
According to the court in Harksen v Lane, where the differentiation is not on a listed ground but on an analogous ground, the differentiation will constitute discrimination if: 58 a) the differentiation relates to other attributes or characteristics attaching to the persons; and b) the differentiation has the potential to impair the fundamental dignity of persons as human beings, or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner.
Section 294 differentiates between individuals who are able to provide gametes and those who are not. This is a characteristic or an attribute attaching to the person. It further has the effect of impacting on the person in a serious manner compared to those who are able to provide genetic material. The differentiation is thus on an analogous ground and amounts to discrimination. In the case of discrimination on an analogous ground, the discrimination will be presumed to be unfair only if regard is had to the position of the complainants in society, the nature of the provision and the 57 Carnelley and Soni 2008 Speculum Juris 42. In Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 49 the court acknowledged that the specified grounds listed in s 9(3) of the Constitution may "relate to immutable biological attributes or characteristics".
58
Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 46. purpose sought to be achieved by it and the extent to which the discrimination has impacted on the human dignity of the persons concerned. 59 The infertile have historically often been stigmatised for their inability to procreate.
While the purpose behind section 294 is noble, the nature of the infringement suffered by a particular group of infertile individuals serves only to intensify their feelings of inadequacy at being unable to procreate. This then has the effect of impairing their human dignity and amounts to an impairment of a "comparably serious manner".
Section 294 thus unfairly discriminates against a particular group of individuals, which discrimination is unconstitutional.
It is worth noting the recent cases of Mennesson v France and Labassee v France 60
decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), where the court was called upon to determine whether French law which failed to recognise the legal relationship between the commissioning parents and the offspring born from surrogacy arrangements concluded abroad amounted to violations of their rights to respect for private and family life and their right to equality. Surprisingly, while the court found that the law did not amount to a violation of the parents' rights to respect for family life, it did amount to a violation of the children's right to respect for their private lives. 61
In the light of these findings the court found it unnecessary to pronounce on whether the law violated the applicants' rights to equality. 62 Regrettably, South Africa does not have a comparable provision in its Constitution. However, this right may find protection under section 10 of the Constitution according to Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs, 63 which will be referred to later.
59
Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 50. 
A justifiable limitation
If the approach of the ECHR were to be adopted then it would not be necessary to consider whether or not section 294 of the Children's Act constitutes a justifiable limitation on the affected individuals' right to equality. However, it is necessary to do so for the sake of completeness.
As determined above, the infringement of section 12(2)(a) of the Constitution is neither reasonable nor justifiable. The same conclusion can be reached in respect of the violation of section 9 of the Constitution. Under the circumstances, section 294
can only be found to be unconstitutional.
The right to dignity
The right to dignity is protected under section 10 of the Constitution, which provides that: "Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected."
This right was also interpreted in Law v Canada in the following terms:
Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth. It is concerned with physical and psychological integrity and empowerment. Human dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or circumstances which do not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits. It is enhanced by laws which are sensitive to the needs, capacities and merits of different individuals, taking into account the context of their differences. Human dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are marginalised, ignored, or devalued, and is enhanced when laws recognise the full place of all individuals and groups within society. This raises the question whether the requirement in section 294 is necessary. The term "necessary" is defined as that which is essential. 68 Presumably, the necessity of this provision must be determined with reference to the government purpose behind the provision. It has been suggested that this provision will prevent child trade and the commodification of babies, and promote a bond between the parents and child which will be in the child's best interests. In my opinion, this provision is not necessary to achieve the stated government purpose. As previously stated, there are other, less restrictive means of achieving the same goal. This view is confirmed by Lewis Constitutional and Contractual Implications 88-93. Lewis expresses the opinion that: "the limitation which arises out of the application of section 294 on would-be infertile commissioning parents is unjustifiable and does not serve a constitutionally acceptable purpose. The Act expressly discriminates against infertile persons and such discrimination is unfair. As a result of the operation of section 294 of the Act, infertile persons are not permitted to exercise their right to make decisions regarding reproduction and the dignity of these persons is further impaired because they are not permitted to resort to surrogacy as a form of assisted reproduction. The author agrees that the protection of all the parties to the agreement interests must be 3.1.1.4 From unjustifiable limitations to declarations of invalidity?
Where a law or conduct infringes the rights of a person or persons, the said law or conduct is unconstitutional and must be declared invalid. Section 294 infringes the rights of a particular group of infertile individuals and should be declared invalid.
However, declarations of invalidity are not made overnight. Unless Parliament intervenes and amends this provision mero motu -which is the ideal solution in this case -it may take some time before the courts are called upon to pronounce on the constitutionality of section 294.
In the interim, this leaves those individuals who are unable to access surrogacy as a means of assisted reproduction without any options unless recourse is had to adoption. It has been suggested by numerous bodies that adoption is an alternative to surrogacy for those who do not meet the requirements of section 294. What follows is an assessment of adoption and whether it can truly be viewed as an alternative to surrogacy.
Can adoption be an alternative to surrogacy?
It was suggested by the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee that couples who cannot meet the requirements of section 294 consider adoption as an alternative. The Committee maintained that:
[i]n instances where both the male and the female gametes used in the creation of the embryo are donor gametes, it would result in a situation similar to adoption as the child or children would not be genetically linked to the commissioning parent or parents. This would obviate the need for surrogacy as the couple could adopt a child. 70 considered, but without conclusive evidence to show that when the child born of the agreement is genetically related to the commissioning parent that the surrogate mother will be less likely to refuse to hand over the child upon birth, the author cannot submit that the inclusion of section 294, and the restrictive effect that it imposes on infertile persons is warranted and is proportionate to the benefit which [it] aims to achieve". See Lewis Constitutional and Contractual Implications Before considering the veracity of this statement, it is first necessary to consider the meaning of the word "alternative". The Oxford Dictionary defines an alternative as "(of one or more things) available as another possibility or choice". 71
The premise made by the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee suggests that those who are unable to comply with section 294 resort to adoption as an alternative; however, this presupposes that the parties concerned have the choice or option of pursuing adoption.
The adoption process has limitations of its own, which may exclude certain individuals from becoming parents. 72 This already suggests that adoption may not provide another possibility for infertile persons.
Furthermore, the adoption process is very different from surrogacy. Surrogacy arrangements commence prior to the child's birth, whereas adoption in most cases occurs thereafter. 73 Adoption sometimes produces a different outcome from surrogacy. In surrogacy the commissioning parents are guaranteed a child(ren) whom they will care for from birth, whereas in adoption a new-born child is not a guarantee. Further, the issue arising in adoption is very different from the issue in surrogacy cases, namely "how best to care for [the adoptive child] now that the birth family cannot" as opposed to "how best to bring [a child] into the world and into a family that desires a child". 74
In this respect Fretwell Wilson argues that "the strength of the analogy between … adoption and … surrogacy is unclear", 75 with which view the author is inclined to agree.
Given the differences between surrogacy and adoption, the notion that one is an alternative for the other is a huge misconception. The two are vastly dissimilar. Added to which the criteria to assess the suitability of prospective parents is very different in these processes. The factors taken into consideration to determine the suitability of commissioning parents are vastly different from those of adoptive parents. In the case of adoptive parents section 231(2) sets out the requirements to determine the suitability of individuals to adopt. Section 295(b)(ii) maintains that the commissioning parents must be "suitable to accept the parenthood of the child that is to be conceived", but no mention is made of how this suitability is to be assessed.
Schäfer notes that the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee interpreted this element as involving "a strict screening process" and "conclusive evidence". He further notes:
Regrettably these proposals were not adopted in the Children's Act 2005 nor, contrary to the expectations, were they addressed in the Regulations. This element then is one of the weakest in Chapter 19.
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He further states that:
It is very difficult to see how the High Court could assess the commissioning parents' suitability as prospective parents in any meaningful way. This lack of rigour contrasts unfavourably with the screening process required for adoption: an adoption social worker must assess the suitability and ability of a prospective adoptive parent. infertile yet able to provide genetic material. In both instances the parties are infertile.
It is only the origin of their infertility which distinguishes them.
So, based on the evidence referred to by Fretwell Wilson, whether parents are able to provide genetic material for their prospective offspring or not, the likelihood remains that these offsprings' interests will be better promoted than the interests of their counterparts who are born to fertile parents.
In the event that this argument is not sufficiently compelling, it has been suggested in S v M 78 that while the best interests of the child are of vital importance, they are not the only consideration. Moreover, it has been suggested that the application of the principle of the best interests in the context of surrogacy should be considered with caution. 79 This suggests that there are other facts to be considered in deciding who should be permitted to enter into surrogacy agreements. A genetic link is clearly not indicative that the best interests of the child will be protected.
In the absence of a genetic link and absolute certainty regarding the best interests of prospective children, the only other solution would be to consider an alternative basis on which to decide who may enter into surrogacy agreements.
Sattawan and Medhi propose the adoption of an intent-based approach to surrogacy. 80 In their opinion this approach should be "recognised as one of the bas[e]s for determining parental … rights". 81 In terms of this approach parental rights should not be recognised purely on the basis of biology. In instances where commissioning parents are unable to provide a genetic link to their child(ren), the intention to parent should be considered. 82 If such an approach is adopted, then the existence of a genetic link is a possible requirement but not the only one. Both these cases establish intent to parent as a basis for awarding parental rights in the absence of genetic relationships.
A possible way forward?
Section 295(a) requires infertility on the part of the commissioning parents while section 294 requires a genetic link with at least one commissioning parent. These two requirements must both be present in order for a surrogacy agreement to be approved by the courts. The question arises, however, as to why there is a need for both requirements and not for one or the other. The presence of a genetic link is not a guarantee that the best interests of the child will be safeguarded at all times.
Furthermore, the mere fact that a commissioning parent is infertile is not a guarantee that it will make a good parent to a prospective child. While it is submitted that court approval should be a prerequisite for every SMA, a distinction should be made in accordance with the Model Act between cases with a genetic link and cases with no genetic link. Different criteria could then possibly be applied to cater for the difference in circumstances. It is proposed that a special committee 96 or a special division of the Children's Court be constituted to deal with and consider these cases.
Pillay and Zaal 97 suggest that a specialist body review applications before court confirmation takes place. This approach has been adopted in Australia and Israel and has been quite successful. This body or panel would then need to consider who is eligible to enter into a SMA with or without the need for a biological link.
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Whether the same can be said for women who do not want to ruin their careers or their bodies by an intended pregnancy is a debate left for another time. The focus of this article is the position of the infertile with regard to surrogacy.
93 Ryan 1997 Ryan -1998 Nöthling-Slabbert has suggested that "specific regulations relating to surrogate motherhood, issued in terms of the Children's Act, are desperately needed, as those relating to artificial fertilisation only regulate the artificial fertilisation process itself". 98
These regulations could then cater for the two different types of infertility and the requirements that would need to be met in order for surrogacy to be possible.
Conclusion
Roots do matter, as a right to know one's genetic origins plays a pivotal role in informing one's identity. However, they do not matter so much as to require genetic material from at least one commissioning parent to facilitate a surrogacy arrangement.
What is or should be important is the commissioning parent(s) suitability to parent, which can be gathered from, amongst other evidence, their intention to parent.
Biology/genetics provides no guarantee for the welfare of the child. In fact, it has been suggested that the absence of a genetic link may provide a better guarantee of the child's welfare. 99 
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